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1.  INTRODUCTION 
During the 19th and 20th centuries, the issue of population explosion, particularly in 
the developing countries, was at the forefront of policy debates1. As a result, 
population control became an integral part of the economic development agenda 
of multilateral institutions and many countries around the world (Connelly, 2008).  
The fear of unmanageable population explosion has abated in the 21st 
century. This has been replaced in some countries by the fear that they may 
experience severe challenges arising from prolonged low fertility rates, which could 
eventually result in declining population, and subsequent loss of economic 
dynamism and military strength. Four out of nine people already live in countries in 
which the fertility rate has dipped below the replacement rate. According to the 
United Nations, the world’s average fertility would fall below the replacement rate 
by 2025 (The Economist, 2007). Central and Eastern Europe (from Germany to 
Russia); the Northern Mediterranean; and parts of East Asia are already facing the 
serious challenges arising from depopulation.  
The East Asian city-state of Singapore has experienced below-replacement 
fertility rates since 1975. It is ranked as having the third lowest Total Fertility Rate (TFR) 
of 1.082  in the world in 2008 (CIA, 2008). It may therefore represent an instructive 
case-study of policy responses and implications of prolonged low fertility rate.   
Singapore is among the most globalized economies in the world, with external 
demand, technology, investments, and manpower playing a dominant role in its 
evolution from a low-middle income country in the 1960s to a high-income country 
today (Rajan, 2003).    
Singapore’s globalization strategy is creating significant inequalities, and 
relative poverty.  Thus, Singapore’s Gini Coefficient (a measure of income inequality) 
                                                  
1 Between 1900 and 2000, there was a near quadrupling of the world’s population. 
2 TFR is defined as the average number of children that would be born to a woman over her 
lifetime, under certain specific assumptions. The officially reported TFR for Singapore at 1.29 in 
2007 is however much higher. The TFR of 1.3 has a special mathematical significance for the 
demographers. At that rate, a country’s population becomes half in 45 years.   3 
 
increased from 0.44 in 1990 to 0.48 in 2000, to 0.52 in 2005, with rising value implying 
greater inequality. The ratio of disposable income of the highest 20 percent to that 
of the lowest 20 percent has also increased from 11.4 in 1990 to 20.9 in 2000 (for 
Taiwan, the corresponding figures are 5.2 and 5.6) (Chua, 2007a). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. An overview of Singapore’s 
demographic trends is provided in Section 2. This is followed by a discussion of the 
policy responses of the Singapore government to manage prolonged fertility decline 
in Section 3. The final section provides concluding observations. 
2.  The Demographic Trends 
  Singapore has experienced a prolonged period of declining fertility and high 
life expectancy  for more than three decades. Singapore’s fertility rate in 1957 
peaked to six children per woman, but dramatically declined to the replacement 
level of 2.15 by 1975. It has experienced below-replacement fertility since then. 
Factors attributed to such rapid decline in fertility include higher ages at marriage 
and childbearing; and greater family planning measures among the resident 
population. The life expectancy at birth has also increased from around 68 years in 
1970 to 80.4 years in 2007 (ROS, DOS, 2008). This is expected to rise to around 85 
years by 2050 (UN, 2006).   
  Declining fertility rates and increasing life expectancy (both at birth and at 
old-age) has lead to profound changes in the age-structural composition of the 
population. This has resulted in population ageing, labor force shortages, increasing 
elderly dependency ratios, and feminization of the elderly population. This has 
important implications for resource needs for retirement and health care. 
Selected indicators of Singapore’s demographic profile for its resident 
population are provided in Table 1. Singapore’s rapid ageing is particularly evident 
after 2010 (Table 1). Thus, population aged above 65 years, as projected by the 
United Nations, will increase from about 0.46 million in 2010 to 1.41 million in 2030, an 
increase of 207 percent in just two decades (Table 1).  
(Insert Table 1 here) 4 
 
Life expectancy at age 65, currently at 17.2 years for men, and 20.6 years for 
women (ROS, DOS, 2008) is also expected to rise, thereby posing even greater 
challenges in managing an ageing society. The working-age persons to elderly ratio 
will decline from 7.7 in 2010 to 2.2 in 2030, and further to 1.8 in 2050. The median age 
of the resident population in 2007 was 36.4 years, and this is expected to increase to 
53.7 by 2050 (ROS, DOS, 2008; UN, 2006).  
The above dynamics of rapid ageing is evident from the population pyramids 
for Singapore over the period 2000-2050 (Figure 1). The changes in age-structure 
revealed by the pyramid in 2010 and in 2050 are particularly striking. Thus, in 2010, 
the largest number of men and women were in the 40-44 age group; but by 2050, it 
is projected that the largest number of females will be in the 75-79 age group, and 
men in the 55-59 age group. This also suggests increasing feminization of the elderly 
population.  
(Insert Figure 1 here) 
Table 2 provides age-specific Labor Force Participation Rate (LFPR) for males 
and females in Singapore for 2006. Singapore’s total LFPR, at 65 percent, is higher 
than the corresponding figure for Japan (54 percent) and Korea (62 percent), but 
lower than that of Denmark (78 percent) and Canada (67 percent)3. The LFPR for 
age-groups between 40 to 64 years are however much lower in Singapore. Thus, for 
the age-group 60-64 years, Singapore’s LFPR at 44 percent compares unfavorably 
with Japan (55 percent), Korea (56 percent), Canada (45 percent) and United 
States (52 percent). Such a pattern is also observed in the LFPR for the 65-69 age-
group.  
Singapore policymakers have argued that a longer period in the labor force 
may be an important instrument for coping with financing needs in old age. But 
even for the 60-64 age-group, only 44 percent are in the labor force and this figure 
declines sharply at higher ages (Table 2). This is particularly the case with women, 
where only one in six women in the 65-69 years age-group was in the labor force in 
2006. Since the mean life expectancy at age 65 for women was 20.6 years in 2006, 
                                                  
3 Data for other countries are obtained online from ILO LABORSTA database, 
http://laborsta.ilo.org/, accessed on June 12, 2008.  5 
 
such a low level of labor force does not suggest that this will be a major instrument 
for ensuring financial adequacy in old age.  
(Insert Table 2 here) 
The above analysis suggests that Singapore’s demographic transition has 
been consistent with trends observed in industrial countries, except that the transition 
has occurred much more rapidly in the case of Singapore. Singapore has moved 
from being a high-fertility, low middle-income country during the 1950s to a high 
income, demographically mature city-state in the span of a few decades.  
  
3.  Policy Responses 
The policy responses to managing prolonged low fertility levels in Singapore have 
been wide-ranging. They are discussed below. 
Strong emphasis on growth and fiscal management:  
Singapore has continued to emphasize high growth, which its policymakers regard 
as essential for a city-state to sustain its competitiveness and dynamism in a 
globalizing world; and to address various political-economy and demographic 
challenges.  
Singapore has recorded persistent budget surpluses, measured according to 
the IMF methodology (and has accumulated substantial fiscal reserves) over the 
years (Asher, 2003)4. The fiscal surpluses have been primarily due to the extensive use 
of non-conventional revenue sources. Thus, during the 1991 to 2001 period, the fiscal 
revenue from leasing of land5  averaged 6.2 percent of GDP annually, while its 
                                                  
4 As at 31st March 2000, the total assets of the Singapore government were $319 billion (Asher, 
2003). Estimates of such assets are not available for recent years. 
5 The state currently holds more than 85 percent of land, which it leases to users. At the time 
of Singapore’s Independence in 1965, the government however owned only 40 percent of 
the land.  There is neither a constitutional nor a common law right to own land.  6 
 
reported investment income included in the budget6 averaged 4.5 percent of GDP 
annually (Asher, 2003, Table 8.1).   
Singapore has also made extensive use of regulatory levies, such as the 
Electronic Road Pricing (ERP), and the Certificate of Entitlement (COE) (requirement 
of the right to own a car for a 10-year period) to generate budgetary revenue.  
While Singapore does not publish net national saving, or a breakdown of 
gross domestic saving, Asher (2003) has estimated that between 1991-2001, 
budgetary savings contributed on the average about two-fifths of gross domestic 
saving7.  
High Net Immigration 
Singapore’s TFR has been below the replacement rate for over three 
decades. Policymakers realize that measures designed to increase TFR such as the 
Children Development Co-savings (Baby Bonus) Scheme 8, increased maternity 
leave, and subsidies for infant and child care are likely to have a limited impact on 
the fertility levels. The primary instrument therefore has been relatively large-scale 
and sustained but selective net immigration. Singapore has given strong signals that 
such net immigration will be pursued without changing the dominant Chinese 
character of the city-state, and altering the ethnic composition.   
                                                  
6 Singapore’s two Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs), Government Investment Corporation (GIC) 
and Temasek Holdings, as a result of specific statutes, are not required to provide any 
information on their investment policies and performance. Recently, there has been a 
provision that 50 percent of net investment income (whose definition is not provided by the 
authorities) will be included in the budget. So, the figures cited in the text on the contribution 
of investment income to fiscal revenues significantly understate their contribution. Truman 
(2007) estimates Singapore’s foreign exchange reserves at US$ 152 billion (as of September 
2007) and its SWF assets at US$323 billion. 
7 For a more detailed analysis of the composition of saving in Singapore, see Peebles and 
Wilson (2002).  
8 The Baby Bonus Scheme was introduced in 2001. It provides children of citizens (first to fourth 
child) a cash gift of S$6000 and co-savings (i.e. a dollar for dollar matching) of up to S$12,000 
per child by the government. The scheme applies until the child is six years old 
(http://www.babybonus.gov.sg/bbss/html.index.html). These appear to be a relatively small proportion 
of the total cost of bringing up a middle-class child. 7 
 
Table 3 provides a breakdown of Singapore’s population between citizens, 
permanent residents, and foreign workers and their dependents. The data indicates 
a sharp decline in the share of citizens in the total population between 1990 and 
2005. The share of citizens declined by 15 percentage points from 86.1 percent in 
1990 to 71.5 percent in 2005. Correspondingly, the share of permanent residents 
nearly tripled while the share of non-resident population nearly doubled during the 
period. In 2005, close to 30 percent of the total population were non-citizens. This 
share is expected to rise (Burton, 2007). Such level of absorption of foreign-born 
persons is likely to bring profound but subtle changes in the Singapore society, the 
contours of which will unfold only over time.  
 (Insert Table 3 here) 
In February 2007, Singapore officially announced a population target of 6.5 
million. While an exact date has not been set, media reports suggest a time frame of 
two decades.  
A public opinion survey published in a local paper in early 2007 reports that, 
nearly 43 percent of Singaporeans believed the government is more concerned 
about foreign talent than citizens; and doubted that high in-migration helps create 
jobs and fresh opportunities. Nearly 9 respondents out of 10 feared that foreign 
talent will take away their jobs (Bala, 2007).  It is significant that these perceptions 
are held when Singapore is currently experiencing a favorable macro-economic 
cycle.  This suggests that the political management would become even more 
difficult if employment growth slows substantially. This is relevant as the 6.5 million 
population target implies much higher levels of net in-migration. If the negative 
perceptions about foreign talent take deep root, it could have a negative impact 
on the attraction of Singapore as a business location (Bala, 2007), and therefore in 
managing the impacts of low fertility. 
Unpublished research by Singapore’s foremost demographic expert, Dr G 
Shantakumar suggests that while relatively high net immigration sustained over time 
can help in averting a decline in population, it will not prevent the rapid ageing of 
Singapore’s population9. 
                                                  
9 Personal communication with Dr G Shantakumar. 8 
 
Singapore’s official attitude towards its citizens emigrating abroad has been 
shifting from ridiculing them as “quitters” to cautiously encouraging them to retain at 
least some links with Singapore.  A survey by Singapore Press Holdings in July 2006 
found that two-thirds of young Singaporeans wanted to work abroad, and more 
than half of them would consider emigration (The Straits Times, June 14, 2008).  
There are no regularly published figures on emigration from Singapore. But a 
recent official figure suggest that at least 150,000 (4.8 percent of citizens in 2005) 
Singaporeans, mostly in their prime working age, are living abroad. About 1000 
citizens are annually giving up their Singapore citizenship (The Straits Times, June 14, 
2008). 
Thus, even as Singapore government attempts to compete for talent from 
abroad, it has been facing a difficult challenge of retaining its own citizens. This 
challenge with become more acute as the proportion of those from abroad 
markedly grows.  
Besides addressing the root causes of such a large emigration, Singapore 
policymakers also need to consider more flexible categories, with varying degrees of 
rights already enjoyed by the citizens. This may include persons of Singapore origin 
category under which individuals can obtain most economic benefits enjoyed by 
the citizens; less discrimination against permanent residents in housing and other 
economic benefits; and automatic right of citizenship to those born in Singapore, as 
well as for children with at least one Singapore parent. More liberal rules of 
employment for expatriate spouses could also help augment the labor supply.   
 
Minimum Social Risk Pooling in Financing Retirement and Health Care 
Unlike other high-income, demographically mature economies, Singapore has relied 
almost exclusively on a single-tier mandatory savings arrangement10, administered 
by the Central Provident Fund (CPF), has become the key social, political, and 
economic institution in the country. The CPF system is quite complex, due to its 
                                                  
10 Foreign workers who are not citizens or Permanent Residents (PRs) are not permitted to be 
a part of the CPF system. They also do not receive public assistance or other benefits. 9 
 
multiple roles. It is for example the primary mortgage financing institution in the 
country. The CPF scheme does not contain any social risk pooling element. 
The CPF contributions are channeled to three accounts. Two-thirds are 
channeled to the Ordinary Account (OA) which can be used for housing and 
investment schemes. 19 percent are channeled to the Medisave Account (MA) 
which can be used for hospitalization expenses, and for catastrophic health 
insurance. The remaining 14 percent is channeled into Special Account (SA), which 
is can be used for retirement and other purposes.     
Effective from July 1, 2007, the CPF contribution rate of the employers was 
raised by 1.5 percentage points to 14.5 percent for the employers, while the rate for 
employees remained unchanged at 20 percent, for a total of 34.5 percent. There 
was however no increase in the wage ceiling of $4,500 per month11. If such a ceiling 
remains fixed in nominal terms over a long period, it implies a decrease in the wage 
ceiling in real terms. This in turn will further adversely impact the replacement rate.  
In 2006, the average balance per member of $40,598 was less than per 
capita GDP of $46,832. This is quite inadequate as an average person will require 
financing for at least two decades during retirement. The increase in the age at 
which a member can withdraw the minimum sum in monthly installments, from 62 to 
65 years, will not make additional resources available during retirement12.   
                                                  
11 The total CPF contribution rate was 36 percent in 2001, with a wage ceiling of $6000, with 
the employer and employee contributions at 16 and 20 percent respectively. The employer 
contribution was reduced to 13 percent, for a total of 33 percent in 2003. The rate and the 
wage ceiling changes have been undertaken in response to macroeconomic conditions 
and the perceived need to sustain Singapore’s business competitiveness. But these changes 
are potentially reducing resources from the CPF for retirement at the time when the need for 
more resources is urgent due to demographic trends.  
12 The minimum sum is the amount people must keep in their retirement accounts after 
withdrawing their CPF at age 55. Currently, a member may withdraw the minimum sum (as of 
July 1, 2007 this was $99,600) at age 62 in monthly installments over roughly 20 year period. 
According to official figures, of the 22,600 CPF members who turned 62 years in 2006, only 34 
percent were able to meet the minimum sum requirements. The median shortfall for the 
remaining members was $49,300, nearly half of the minimum sum.  10 
 
It is now reluctantly acknowledged, even by the policymakers in Singapore, 
that the CPF system will not be adequate to meet the ageing challenges. There are 
several reasons for this inadequacy.  
First, given the multiple focus of the CPF, the proportion of contributions 
withdrawn during the pre-retirement period is very high, averaging 82.7% during the 
2001-2006 period (CPF, 2006).  The share of contributions devoted to retirement is 
therefore low. In some years, discretionary policy measures have reduced the CPF 
contributions towards retirement to zero. 
Second,  design and governance issues also act against the adequacy 
objective; and so does the tendency to use the CPF system as a short-term 
stabilization instrument. The CPF contribution rates and wage ceiling have been 
dramatically reduced when macro-economic cycles suggested slower growth; and 
increased when the opposite was indicated.  
The administered interest rate structure, and lack of transparency and 
accountability in the ultimate investments of CPF balances ($125.8 billion as of 
December 2006) have meant low real returns on these balances13. Thus from the 
1987 to 2006 period the annual real rate of return credited to CPF members was 1.26 
percent. As the returns are lower than their corresponding growth in GDP of about 
8% and in real wages of around 4.5%, the replacement rate is likely to be low. 
The interest rate paid on CPF balances has been a weighted average of 
savings account and one year fixed deposit interest rates of domestic banks, with a 
minimum nominal interest rate of 2.5 percent14. The investment of the CPF Board is in 
essence only in non-marketable government securities. The interest on these 
securities is determined retroactively based on the interest declared on CPF 
balances.  
                                                  
13 Chua (2007b) has argued that the inflation rate in Singapore, as measured by the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) is significantly understated, primarily because of the way the 
housing component is incorporated. This could result in even lower real rate of return. 
14 On balances in SA and MA of the CPF funds, the administered interest is 1.5 percentage 
points higher than the declared rate. 11 
 
In August 2007, the government announced changes in the administered 
interest rate arrangements, effective from 2008. For the first $60,000 of CPF balances, 
a member will receive an additional 1 percentage point over the normal rate. 
However, instead of paying 1.5 percentage points more than the normal rate on 
balances in MA and SA accounts, the rate will be pegged to a rate of 10-year 
Singapore government securities plus 1 percentage point.   
  The Singapore budget has shown a trend towards persistent and large 
structural surpluses 15 . The CPF balances have therefore not been used for 
government expenditure. Instead, through complex procedures, they are turned 
over to one of Singapore’s holding companies, GIC (Government Investment 
Corporation). 
  GIC has a global portfolio. By statutory protection, it does not need to reveal 
its investment policies and performance to the public or the Parliament. To the 
extent GIC obtains a higher return than those credited to the CPF members, the 
difference is an implicit tax or a tax on CPF wealth. This is large, growing, and highly 
regressive, as low income households are likely to have a disproportionate share of 
their wealth in CPF balances (Asher and Nandy, 2006).  
  There are also two other factors which reduce the real value of CPF balances. 
First, Singapore increased the rate of its Goods and Services Tax (GST) from 5 percent 
to 7 percent in 2007. There is strong econometric evidence from international 
experiences that such an increase will raise the cost of living by the same 
percentage points as the increase in GST, i.e. 2 percent. This will act as a tax on CPF 
wealth. Second, in 2008, Singapore’s inflation rate is expected to be about 6 
percent. To the extent interest credited to CPF members is less than the inflation rate, 
an erosion of the real value of CPF balances will arise. This will further accentuate the 
inadequacy of the CPF for financing retirement and health care. Singapore also has 
the highest negative real interest rate (3-month market rate minus official CPI 
inflation) of about 5.5 percent in Asia (Minder, 2008). This distorts household financial 
                                                  
15 As at March 2004, total accumulated budget surpluses were $399.1 billion or 228 percent of 
GDP (IMF, 2006, p.16). The IMF (2006) study reports that “there is…no comprehensive 
information on the market value of the government’s assets, including those of the 
Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC)” (p.16). 12 
 
decisions. The centralized control of national savings by the government agencies 
and banks however is of considerable advantage to those controlling them.  
Blake et al. (2008) suggest that a DC system should be designed from back to 
front (that is, from desired outputs to required inputs) with the goal of delivering an 
adequate targeted pension with a high degree of probability. In Singapore, there 
has been no public discussion of the actual replacement rate that will be obtained 
by different cohorts of the elderly. There also does not appear to be any target rate 
of replacement and the contribution of the CPF’s savings and other instruments to 
the rate. Singapore’s DC system thus does not meet the requirement of good design 
recommended by Blake et al. (2008).  
It should be emphasized even without the above design and governance 
features, a single-tier retirement financing system involving only mandatory-savings, 
can never provide an adequate replacement rate; or address inflation and 
longevity risks16; or provide survivor and disability benefits (Asher and Nandy, 2006).  
A multi-tier system involving a mixture of defined benefit (DB) and defined 
contribution (DC) schemes, with varying degrees of risk-pooling or risk-sharing 
arrangements are needed for a robust, adequate, and equitable social security 
system (Holzmann and Hinz, 2005).  
Singapore’s health care financing system follows a pattern similar to the 
retirement financing system.  The share of private provision of health care in 
Singapore is around three-fourths, with one-fourth coming from the government 
budget (Asher and Nandy, 2006a).  The respective shares are reversed in the OECD 
(Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development). countries. The private-
public composition of healthcare expenditure in 1980 resembled the current OECD 
composition.  So the public policies have contributed to a lopsided share of private 
                                                  
16 In August 2007, the government announced that the members will have to compulsorily 
purchase an annuity from their own balances at age 55, while the benefits will be paid after 
a member reaches 85 years. The government has ruled out any budgetary support for the 
scheme. But the other details have still not been announced. The compulsory annuity will 
reduce already low CPF balances, thus adversely affecting the adequacy. If the generally 
observed correlation between income and life expectancy holds for Singapore, then the 
compulsory annuity will be inequitable as poorer groups will receive proportionately less 
benefits. There are no plans for inflation indexation of the annuity.  13 
 
provisions in health care.  The share of third party payment through insurance and 
other risk-pooling instruments in Singapore’s national health expenditure is extremely 
low. The adverse impact of these factors has been partially mitigated by the state’s 
utilizing its overwhelming dominance over hospital beds to promote autonomy and 
efficiency in the hospitals (Ramesh, 2008). 
The Medishield scheme, which is Singapore’s health insurance scheme for 
relatively long hospital stays, has no social risk-pooling arrangements as premiums 
vary positively with age17. Moreover, the coverage stops at age 85.  Table 1 suggests 
that the number of old-old (over 80 years) will rise rapidly reaching 88,000 by 2010, 
and 297,000 by 2030. Assuming the cut-off age for Medishield remains constant, 
there will be an estimated 111,000 persons above 85 years (US Census Bureau, 2006) 
who will not have the basic catastrophic insurance coverage during their most 
vulnerable stage in life. 
For an affluent and rapidly ageing society, assessment of the health financing 
system needs to go beyond the conventional indicators. If international experience 
is any guide, social risk-pooling in the financing of healthcare, near universal 
coverage, and greater individual choice should be additional criteria in evaluating 
a health system. The application of technology in healthcare provision becomes 
more pervasive in an affluent and aging society. This drives up costs, making cost 
control a high-priority objective. In addition, the expectations concerning quality of 
healthcare are much higher. At the same time, low fertility rates make reliance on 
family and immediate community more difficult to sustain. 
The above discussion suggests that minimizing the importance of the social 
insurance and social risk pooling elements in the retirement and health financing 
systems has been a key method of coping with low fertility rates over a prolonged 
period. The policymakers have repeatedly emphasized that this approach will 
continue even as Singapore’s demographic structure begins to resemble that of a 
typical OECD country. Singapore’s strong fiscal position and increasingly aggressive 
                                                  
17 The Singapore government has adopted an opt-out method for enrolling newborn babies 




investment strategies of its SWFs have provided resources and flexibility to enhance 
the adequacy of their retirement and health care financing systems. 
A research finding which should be especially illuminating for the Singapore 
policymakers is the following. In Europe, the Scandinavian countries have both the 
most extensive social-welfare systems in Europe and at 1.8, among the highest 
fertility rates (Shorto, 2008).  
Other Measures 
Singapore has also begun to undertake certain measures that encourage the 
continued employment of the aged, including raising the retirement age, opening 
job placement offices for the elderly, and providing subsidies to companies that hire 
elderly workers, both male and female. Increasing the labor force participation rate 
of women of all ages is helpful in coping with labor supply constraints arising from 
prolonged low fertility rates.  
Subsidies are also provided to certain voluntary organizations that undertake 
various community-based social services for the elderly.  
Though the government’s explicit philosophy has been to discourage 
institutional long-term care for the elderly, it has encouraged certain community-
based aged services. The government’s Housing and Development Board (HDB) 
offers housing plans for multi-generational families; and ‘granny’ flats for the elderly. 
However, unlike other high-income, depopulating economies, it has not 
taken sufficient advantage of the demographic complementarities with other Asian 
countries (such as India, Philippines, or Vietnam), by engaging in outsourcing and 
offshoring activities, despite its geographical and cultural proximity to these 
economies; and technological sufficiency. It has therefore failed to sufficiently 
extend its economic space as an instrument for countering the labor force and 
productivity impacts of prolonged fertility decline. 
Singapore is attempting to increase the identification between companies 
and the domestic workers. The policymakers hope that this will make companies 
more willing to provide health and retirement benefits, as well as training. The key 
objective is employability of workers at all ages. 15 
 
4.  Concluding Remarks 
Singapore has experienced prolonged period of below-replacement fertility rates for 
more than three decades. Declining fertility and increasing life expectancy, along 
with high levels of per capita income and education, have resulted in profound 
changes in the age-structural composition of its population over the years. Such 
demographic changes have lead to population ageing, labor force shortages, 
increasing elderly dependency ratios, and feminization of the elderly population, 
thereby posing significant challenges to the policymakers. The primary challenge 
has been to sustain its growth and economic dynamism, while simultaneously 
managing the implications of a prolonged period of low fertility on the economy 
and the society. 
Singapore’s approach to managing the challenges of prolonged low fertility 
rates has been wide-ranging. Singapore has emphasized high growth and prudent 
fiscal management to lessen the fiscal impact of its ageing population. It is 
consciously attempting to focus on Gross National Product (GNP) which includes 
investment income earned overseas from accumulated financial assets. Its two SWFs 
have been quite aggressive in their investment strategies in pursuit of higher returns.  
Singapore has consciously encouraged high net immigration on a sustained 
basis, but without altering the predominance of the Chinese population. Singapore 
has invested heavily in physical infrastructure, in social and cultural amenities, and 
has pursued flexible labor markets and government procedures to facilitate the 
inflow of requisite manpower. At the same time, it is cautiously encouraging past 
emigrants to retain some links with Singapore.  
Singapore has primarily relied on a single-tier mandatory savings mechanism 
to provide for retirement income security, and health care. It has been reluctant to 
broaden social risk pooling through a multi-tier approach (even though it has run 
persistent government surpluses and accumulated comfortable foreign reserves), 
and has discouraged long-term institutional care for the aged. Such reliance 
however is contingent on the continued one-party dominance of Singapore’s 
political, social, economic, and cultural landscape. A more contested political 
arena and weakening of one-party dominance are likely to make the current 
mechanism politically unsustainable.   16 
 
Unlike other high-income, depopulating economies, it has not taken sufficient 
advantage of the demographic complementarities with other Asian countries (such 
as India, Philippines, or Vietnam), by engaging in outsourcing and offshoring 
activities, despite its geographical and cultural proximity to these economies; and 
technological sufficiency. It has therefore failed to extend its economic space.  
As Singapore responds to low rates of fertility to a prolonged period of time, 
and forces of globalization, it faces a fundamental dilemma. It must ensure its 
competitiveness as a business location on the one hand, and meet its residents’ 
needs and expectations on the other.   The danger is that if the balance is shifted 
too far in the direction of Singapore as a business location, both aspects of 
Singapore (business location and a nation) may be undermined.  If the balance is 
shifted towards meeting the national needs, then the trade-off will be acceptance 
of somewhat slower growth.   
Singapore will have to make participating in the labor force and procreating 
more compatible if it is to manage prolonged periods of low fertility. It will also have 
to meet the needs and expectations of an increasingly demanding and 
internationally mobile population for better balance between work and life; and for 
increased economic security and better risk management in old-age. This will be a 
















Table 1: Selected Indicators of Ageing in Singapore 
 
  Population aged 65+  Population aged 80+  Dependency Ratio  Working- 17 
 
Medium Variant  Medium Variant  Medium variant  age/Elderly 
Year (thousands) (Percent) (thousands) (Percent) (Total) (Child) (Old-
age) 
 
2000  287 7.2  48 1.2  41  31  10  10.0 
2010  461 10.0  88  1.9  35  21  13  7.7 
2020  871 17.5  153  3.1  43  18  25  4.0 
2030  1411 26.8  291  5.5  69  24  45  2.2 
2050  1632 31.3  730 14.0  78  23  56  1.8 
Source: Calculated from Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision and 










Male  Female  Total 
15-19  12.6 12.1  12.2 
20-24  71.4 70.0  70.7 
25-29  94.0 84.5  89.0 
30-34  98.0 77.7  87.2 
35-39  98.2 70.4  83.8 
40-44  97.7 67.7  82.5 
45-49  96.5 66.2  81.4 
50-54  93.3 59.5  76.8 
55-59  81.9 44.7  63.5 
60-64  62.5 26.2  43.9 
65-69  36.0 15.6  25.3 
70-74  20.0 7.7  13.2 
75 & 
above 
6.8 2.0  3.9 
TOTAL  76.2  54.3  65.0 
Note: The Singapore’s resident labor force was 1.88 million in June 2006, while the 
total labor force was 2.59 million.    







Table 3: Singapore: Population Composition, 2007 
   1990  2000  2005  2007 




































Note: *Includes Permanent Residents. 
Source: Chua (2007b); Republic of Singapore (ROS), Department of Statistics (DOS) (2008); ROS, DOS 
(2002).  19 
 
Figure 1: Singapore Population Pyramids, Selected Years 
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